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Abstract: In 1964 Rudolph Lorenz published an article in the Zeitschrift für Kirchen-
geschichte entitled “Gnade und Erkenntnis bei Augustinus”, in which he discussed 
links between Augustine’s concepts of intellect and grace and possible implications 
with regard to Augustine’s teachings on Predestination and Original Sin. This paper 
takes up some of Lorenz’s points and tries to develop them further. It concludes that 
one of the reasons why Augustine was so adamant in defending these controversial 
doctrines and why he was unable to share the concerns of contemporaries regarding 
their controversial nature was the fact that he understood them in the context of his 
intellectualist framework. For him this made them “comprehensible”. At the same 
time, not framing the human intellectual endeavour in the context of a teaching on 
grace would have meant for Augustine a depressing reduction of the most essential 
and fulfilling form of human activity to a mere natural process, while in his view it 
originated gratuitously in God and linked each human being to eternal salvation in 
Christ and communion with God. 
 
At the risk of appearing “un-original” I intend to follow a fairly well-trodden path 
today and present a re-appraisal of Rudolf Lorenz’ train of thought, laid out in his 
seminal article Gnade und Erkenntnis bei Augustinus published in 1964.
2
 Perhaps 
I should have given my paper a sub-title like, “a re-appraisal of Rudolf Lorenz”. 
But this would have given the game away; and at any rate, in some respects I do 
hope to be able to point beyond Lorenz. Still, Lorenz’ paper was a guiding study 
for my own doctoral research during the mid-90s, published in 1997.
3
 However, 
as I recognize now, many of its valuable points I was quite unable to appreciate 
then, be it from lack of intellectual maturity or because I felt under pressure to 
produce something “original” myself. 
                                                 
1
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 My focus then was quite different from Lorenz’. I began my research under the 
impression of the acrimonious debate provoked by Kurt Flasch’s polemic against 
Augustine’s “logic of terror”, Logik des Schreckens, his teachings of original sin 
(in the sense of a genetically inherited guilt) and predestination (in the sense of a 
non-predestination and gratuitous damnation of the non-elect), which in Flasch’s 
view had overshadowed, for centuries, earlier, classical and early Christian views 
of a good, rationally ordered creation, a humanity guided by reason and freedom 
of the will. Flasch held Augustine responsible for the dominance in the west of a 
negative view of humanity which gave rise to inhumanity and totalitarianism. I 
list a few of the most important titles for that debate: John Rist’s article of 1969, 
Kurt Flasch’s book of 1990, Aimé Solignac’s article of 1988, which would also be 
worth a thorough re-appraisal one day, a paper by Gerard O’Daly of 1989, James 
Wetzel’s work of 1992, the work of Pierre-Marie Hombert of 1996, and my own 
responses to these contributions.
4
 
 Much of that acrimonious debate has meanwhile subsided and in today’s paper 
it will be put to one side. Rather than calling Augustine’s position fundamentally 
in question I will try first to build it up from its own principles following Lorenz’s 
account very closely. Only in a second step I will ask some questions of the kind 
raised by some of the above listed items. As you can see, I also reversed the order 
of the title of Lorenz’ article (“grace and intellect…”) thereby emphasizing the 
intellectualist perspective of my paper, which is very similar to that of my recent 
paper “Intellektualistischer Voluntarismus” published in 2010.5 
 Augustine was by nature – or should we rather say, by grace? – an intellectual. 
Intellect was what he was seeking all his life. Now my understanding of intellect 
(intellectus) in this context, or rather, my understanding of Augustine’s under-
standing of it, is that it is broadly Platonist. By this I mean that it is not merely 
practical or pragmatic skill, or even intelligence, or pure reason, or knowledge, 
but essential (substantial) insight (“epoptics”, inner vision), understanding of the 
essence (or nature) of things, and ultimately of reality itself, as a whole; which 
also points to the theological dimension of the concept, and also to the dimension 
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of self-knowledge, which is implicit to my paper throughout, and on occasion also 
made explicit. 
The reason why I call Augustine’s understanding of intellect “broadly” (rather 
than “strictly”) “Platonist” is that it seems embedded in a certain terminological 
fluidity. This is largely due, I believe, to the rhetorical character of Augustine’s 
thought. Augustine is no scholastic. But in the relevant texts we find a range of 
expressions similar or related to “intellect” (intellectus) used in pragmatic ways, 
such as, for example, cognitio, scientia, sapientia, ratio, visio, contemplatio, and 
even fides and gratia, and the respective verbs, intellegere, cogitare etc., all used 
with slightly different meanings, depending on the context, but all to support the 
underlying intellectualist agenda. I shall not subject these concepts to meticulous 
analyses with the aim to reconstruct a perfectly coherent and consistent system of 
Augustinian thought. Such a system does not exist. Rather, I shall try to use these 
concepts pragmatically and hermeneutically, taking into account Augustine’s own 
reasons for using and developing them, and I hope that the examples which I will 
cite are a fair representation of Augustine’s thought and demonstrate by and large 
its claim to a certain coherence and plausibility, based on its own presuppositions. 
Nor will I focus on the aspect to what extent intellect is also to be understood 
as salvific in a religious sense (which led Augustine to join the Manichaeans). I 
merely observe that the promise of intellect, rather than authoritative belief, was 
what attracted Augustine to the Manichaeans.
6
 In De Trinitate, a very late work, 
Augustine still remembers how Cicero’s Hortensius unlocked for him the desire to 
understand reality intrinsically, at the level of its very nature,
7
 though the nouns 
used here, borrowed from Cicero, are ‘una cognitio’ and ‘una scientia’. 
 Already very early in his work Augustine also identified the ultimate reality 
with God,
8
 though this created for him the problem how to relate the obligation of 
faith with his quest for intellect. He was not a Gnostic or a pagan Neoplatonist. He 
was an orthodox Christian. Still, I believe that the identity of grace and intellect is 
already expressed in much stronger terms in the Soliloquies than Lorenz allowed 
for in his article. When Augustine speaks of God as potestas nostra ipse, then this 
includes the intellect, or even it refers primarily to the intellect. I hope this will 
become clearer in a moment. 
                                                 
6
 De utilitate credendi 1.2: “The only reason why we fell [for the Manichaeans] was that they 
claimed that without abhorrent authority but by reason alone, pure and simple, they would lead to 
God all those who wanted to be their hearers, and free them from all error.” 
7
 See De Trinitate 14.9.12 (and 19.26): “[In his dialogue Hortensius Cicero argues that in the 
ecstatic philosophical life we do not even need the four cardinal virtues any more … e. g. prudence 
is no longer necessary; consequently] ‘we would be rendered happy by the one cognition and the 
one knowledge regarding nature by which alone even the life of the gods is praiseworthy’” (frg. 
110 Grilli). 
8
 See Soliloquia 2.1.1: Potestas nostra ipse (Deus) est. 
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 It seems to me that Lorenz confirms this by pointing out that there is a link in 
Augustine between intellect and happiness. Augustine develops this extensively in 
De Trinitate 13.4.7-11.15, which I cannot discuss here. For Augustine, the fact 
that everyone seeks happiness indicates that everyone knows what happiness is, 
and that there really is happiness, as a substance of its own; i. e. Augustine does 
not allow for happiness to consist merely in the act of seeking happiness. In his 
view there has to be something like ultimate happiness, from which all inferior 
happiness derives or to which it points. The gap between seeking happiness (or 
intellect) and having found it, indicates that something is missing in someone who 
has not yet found it. That “something” (i. e. that “something” which is missing in 
someone like this), according to Lorenz’ reading of Augustine, is grace (gratia). 
Lorenz points to Augustine’s identification of Christ with scientia et sapientia, or, 
in a citation of 1 Corinthians 1.24, which occurs often in the early works, virtus et 
sapientia Dei, “the strength and wisdom of God”; and Lorenz uses a very strong 
metaphor here to describe the link: “Grace is integrated, built into, the arch [my 
emphasis, JL] of knowledge.”9 
 I am sometimes frustrated by such metaphors. What does it mean? Is grace a 
form of intellect, or vice versa? And how do we have to understand this? Grace is 
supposed to bridge the gap between the desire for happiness and perfect intellect, 
and the fulfilment of that desire. As a concept it is here inferior to the intellect, an 
auxiliary concept therefore. The gap itself, according to Augustine, thus Lorenz 
informs us, quite correctly, is caused by sin. It is not simply a natural gap, which 
could be bridged by natural means. It is a violent rupture, an unbridgeable abyss. 
Thus it is sin that weakens human rationality, and the latter is consequently all the 
more in need of grace. And if grace is at hand, it first appears in the shape not of 
reason itself but of authority, auctoritas, which guides reason back to its original 
path. Reason is suffering from ignorance and weakness and cannot succeed on its 
own. Ignorantia and difficultas, as we all know, are punishments of Original Sin; 
thus a famous passage in De libero arbitrio.
10
 
 Consequently sin does not only hinder the intellect, it suppresses it totally and 
pulls the soul in a totally different direction. The sinful soul actually takes, in a 
perverse way, “delight” in sin. (Of course, this cannot be real delight, but only a 
perverted form of delight.) It cannot but sin. It sins from necessity. This is a train 
of thought which we find extensively developed, explained and defended in 
Augustine’s later thought, for example in the works against Julian of Aeclanum. 
 But let us return to Lorenz: The soul, he continues, is caught in a vicious circle 
in which reason functions as an instrument to aggravate sin. Now the question is 
what can break this vicious circle? What can dissolve this impenetrable illusion, 
                                                 
9
 Lorenz, “Gnade und Erkenntnis” (n. 2), p. 23. 
10
 De libero arbitrio 3.18.52: “Indeed, every sinful soul has been inflicted with these two 
punishments, ignorance and difficulty. Because of ignorance, error shames us; because of 
difficulty torment afflicts us.” 
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or delusion, of the sinful mind, and access reality? What can help the soul to break 
through to the Ding an sich, the reality outside the sinful self, the reality which is 
illuminated by the divine light? Augustine’s answer, according to Lorenz: Fides, 
faith, belief, in the sense of acceptance that progress to intellect is possible, but 
only from a starting point which consists in the knowledge of one’s imperfection 
and ineptness accepted on grounds of authority.
11
 It is an insight which one gains 
not from oneself, but only prompted by an outside message accepted on authority. 
 Interestingly, for Augustine the initium fidei is apparently not a blind, fideistic, 
spot, or move, a Schopenhauerian kind of “pure will”, or a Kierkegaardian “leap 
of faith”. Rather, it contains – already in itself – an element of intellect. “Nobody 
believes something unless he has a prior notion, a cogitatio, or cognitio, that it is 
believable, or that it should be believed,” Augustine writes this in one of his very 
last works, De praedestinatione sanctorum.
12
 
 Lorenz reports that there are certain inconsistencies in Augustine’s concept of 
faith, which have led to controversies in scholarship. Some scholars understand it 
in an intellectual sense, i. e. as a first stage of the intellect, for example when we 
consider that Christ is both the subject and object of faith and intellect, virtus et 
sapientia. Or when we think of John 20.29, where Jesus says to Thomas: “You 
believe because you see me.” But then, of course, adds: “Blessed are those who 
believe, even though they do not see.” And that is another aspect of Augustine’s 
concept of faith, namely quite a strict distinction between authority-based faith 
and reason-based intellect: quod intelligimus debemus rationi, quod credimus, 
auctoritati, Augustine clarifies in the Rectractationes to De utilitate credendi: 
“Intellect we owe to reason, faith to authority.” The intellect-element in faith, a 
minimalist interpretation would argue, is only supposed to extend to the insight 
that faith is necessary as a precondition of the intellectual pursuit, but, as it were, 
not sufficient. That insight is its only intellectual content. It is, to use a notorious 
analogy, the faculty that renders an “unknown unknown” to a “known unknown”, 
i. e. something that is known to be unknown. 
 However, as I already indicated, Augustine is not consistent here, because he 
cannot simply distinguish two totally separate types of intellect: If faith already 
contains a grain of intellect, then it is in a way already a form of intellect. There 
has to be a continuity, or else the universality or completeness, the perfection, of 
intellect would be in doubt. In his attempt to explain faith and the way it functions 
against the background of these problems Augustine resorts to the two concepts of 
will and love, notions which a psychologist of today might refer to as “emotional 
intelligence”. Lorenz sees these two notions as hermeneutical devices that explain 
for Augustine the transition from the vicious circle of an isolated and self-centred 
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 De utilitate credendi 15.33: “The life and habits of men first need to be cleansed through 
authority. Only then they can acquire intellect through reason.” 
12
 De praedestinatione sanctorum 2.5: “Noone believes something unless he has a prior notion 
(nisi prius cogitaverit) that it should be believed (credendum).” 
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world of appearances, or of mere phenomena, to a real world of “substances”, or 
in Lorenz’s terminology, Ideen, ideas (in the Platonist sense), i. e. where reality 
and intellect come together.
13
 
 Since there is no automatism in the application of authority in the sense that 
not everyone who is exposed to authority will find faith and move on to intellect, 
there has to be another explanation why certain people find faith and begin to see 
the world with different eyes, which puts them on a more certain epistemological 
footing, while other people do not. In a passage in De praedestinatione sanctorum 
Augustine answers this question in a for him rather typical manner: “For faith has 
its own kind of eyes, with which it somehow sees to be true that which it does not 
yet see, and with which it sees with utmost certainty that it does not yet see what 
it believes.”14 The word “seeing” (videre), used in a metaphorical and equivocal 
sense, is employed here to describe the epistemological and hermeneutical activity 
in which “faith” is engaged when it is active. 
 Now obviously, in order to initiate faith in this way, and to keep it going, there 
has to be a kind of “intellectual grace”, i. e. a kind of grace that is not just a force 
of practical love and adherence to the law, which provides strength to resist and 
eventually overcome sin and do good, but a kind of grace which is essentially an 
intellectual force, a force that initiates faith and “drives” it as the epistemological 
and hermeneutic activity as which it has just been referred to, thereby generating 
intellect from intellect. 
 From the outset and until the end of his life Augustine saw the intellectual and 
ethical life as a unity: recta ratio est ipsa virtus, he writes in De utilitate credendi 
12.26: “reason, rightly disposed, is the essence of virtue.” But his idea of grace as 
intellect goes even further than that, and it throws quite an unexpected light on the 
controversy with Julian of Aeclanum. 
 It is because he identifies intellect with grace that Augustine must insist against 
Julian on the absolute necessity of grace for salvation, especially in the light of his 
doctrine of original sin and predestination, which extends not only to the sphere of 
ethics, but also to that of epistemology and metaphysics. For Salvation would not 
only not occur without a continuous stream of additional divine input of grace into 
creation channelled through the sacramental activity of the church (baptism) and a 
constant stream of prayer for forgiveness in the context of the church, it would not 
even be comprehensible. It could not be the starting point for an understanding of 
this complex reality: “God, who is the light of the inner man, helps our mind to 
understand that any good we do, we do not by our own but by His justice.”15 
 However, its comprehensibility is not just any odd feature of Salvation. As far 
as Augustine is concerned it is its most fundamental, its central feature. Salvation 
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 See Lorenz, “Gnade und Erkenntnis” (n. 2), p.  
14
 De praedestinatione sanctorum 8.13: Habet namque fides oculos suos quibus quodammodo 
videt verum esse quod nondum videt et quibus certissime videt nondum se videre quod credit. 
15
 De gratia Christi et de peccato originali 2.5.5. 
   JLARC 7 (2013) 15-25                                            21 
 
Josef Lössl, “Intellect and Grace in Augustine of Hippo,” in: Journal for Late Antique Religion 
and Culture 7 (2013) 15-25; ISSN: 1754-517X; Website: http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/clarc/jlarc 
is not something that somehow happens to human beings. Rather, for Augustine, 
it is something which human beings live through, consciously, in a performative 
manner. It is something by which they realise themselves, by which they morph 
into a new, divine, reality, a reality which is pure and complete consciousness. 
Deificari, “becoming God”, Folliet once called it, akin to the Greek Platonist 
concept of homoíosis theô. Salvation for Augustine is self-realisation through 
acquisition of self-knowledge, self-intellect, which is something that is given to 
men by God’s grace and emerging from the being of the human soul itself, from 
its transcendent dimension. Here the teaching on grace and the Neoplatonist self-
transcendent, self-reflective, knowledge converge. 
 For Augustine, there is no difference between a Biblical “hearer of the word” 
(Romans 10.17: “faith comes from hearing”), and a Platonist intellectual, who has 
self-knowledge. Quid est enim a te audire de se nisi cognoscere se? – “For what 
else is hearing from you about oneself but knowing oneself?”, he once writes in 
Confessions 10.3.3. Moreover, an essential of self-knowledge is knowledge of 
one’s infirmity. Grace, Augustine continues the passage in Confessions which I 
just mentioned, strengthens the weak. How? By conveying in the first instance an 
instrinsic knowledge of one’s weakness: qua [gratia] potens est omnis infirmus, 
qui sibi per ipsam fit conscius infirmitatis suae. But equally, it is from itself that 
the soul has this knowledge: [Anima, mens] semetipsam per se ipsam novit.
16
 This 
is because the mind-soul is open to its own transcendence: If you return into your 
self, Augustine writes in De vera religione 72, and keep on transcending yourself, 
by questioning yourself and the conditions of your questioning; if you do that, you 
cannot but reach the truth, which is beyond you and reaches you from that beyond 
from which the light of reason itself shines.
17
 This, as he once famously said in a 
passage of the Confessions, is closer to you than yourself: interior intimo meo.
18
 
God in me. The place where I encounter God. 
 Although unlike Descartes Augustine does not build his whole philosophy on 
this experience, he does recognize its power and ability to provide an instance of 
absolute epistemological certainty. To be sure, Augustine does not construct this 
experience as some kind of thematic knowledge. It is implicit in everything one 
does, transcendental in the Kantian sense, i. e. not referring to objects but to the 
way we relate to objects intellectually, by being mind-souls, intellects, i. e. we 
perceive objects, and in doing so we perceive ourselves as perceiving them and 
we reflect on our way of perceiving them. 
 But, of course, unlike modern philosophers (and ancient ones, as well as the 
Gnostics) Augustine once more sets up some qualifying postulates. For him the 
                                                 
16
 Confessiones 10.3.4; De Trinitate 9.3.3. 
17
 De vera religione 72: Noli foras ire, in teipsum redi. In interiore homine habitat veritas. Et si 
tuam naturam mutabilem inveneris, transcende et te ipsum … Illuc ergo tende unde ipsum lumen 
rationis accenditur. Quo enim pervenit omnis bonus ratiocinator nisi ad veritatem? 
18
 Confessiones 3.6.43. 
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fact that I experience transcendence in me must not be interpreted in the sense that 
I am God, or that there is no God in the naïve sense, because any transcendence 
which I experience in me is simply due to the structure of my mind. But rather, 
what I experience supra me, is te, God.
19
 For Augustine, this experience of 
transcendence constitutes in each of us a memory, which we must interpret as 
memoria Dei and which must find its expression in prayer and confessio. Thus, in 
the light of the Biblical tradition, materially speaking, but substantially grounded 
in the transcendental experience which constitutes memoria Dei, the human being 
is revealed as imago Dei. It is by being imago Dei that man is capable of God, i. e. 
of participating in the reality of God.
20
 
Once more, however, this latter interpretation and above all its explicitation, its 
confession, namely that it is really God, the Biblical God, who is referred to here, 
is secondary to the underlying intellectual experience. “What I have just said,” 
Augustine once comments after finishing a prayer, “is not something which I have 
grasped with the intellect but something which I gathered here and there and 
committed to my memory and which I then accepted, as far as I could, with my 
faith. Knowing is something different.”21 With a statement like this Augustine 
does not commend himself as a supporter of the ontological argument. 
 However, we have also said that whatever a believer expresses in his prayers, 
the primary content of fides is intellectual, i. e. “I am not God. God is the source 
of my intellect.” In this respect, to use Lorenz’ words, “grace leads from intellect 
to intellect … The noetic achievements of grace and intellect are identical.”22 
 At this point Lorenz asks, what we also alluded to already in view of the 
Pelagian controversy: What about the relationship between grace and nature? 
Does not Augustine have to have some kind of concept of supernatural intellect in 
order to uphold his postulate of the necessity of grace? Or, to return to an earlier 
question: If all human beings are created as mind-souls, why are not all achieving 
salvation, i. e. in this case, intellectual fulfilment? 
 Lorenz at this stage continues with a parallel investigation of the structure of 
intellect and grace as a process (Gnade und Erkenntnis als Vorgang).
23
 Both are 
interior, i. e. situated in the interior homo. The direction of the movement is from 
the outside to the inside, from the scattered to the more concentrated, from the un-
identified to the identified, from that which is rejected and discarded to that which 
is approved and substantiated; whereby the impetus for this movement is situated 
in the interior; i. e. we are not pushed towards the interior by something which is 
                                                 
19
 Confessiones 10.26.37: Ubi ergo inveni te ut discerem te, nisi in te supra me? 
20
 De Trinitate 14.8.11: Eo quippe ipso imago eius est quo eius capax est eiusque particeps 
esse potest. 
21
 Soliloquia 1.4.9: Dixi enim non quae intellectu comprehendi sed quae undecumque collecta 
memoriae mandavi et quibus accomodavi quantam potui fidem. scire autem aliud est. 
22
 Lorenz, “Gnade und Erkenntnis” (n. 2), pp. 45-46. 
23
 Lorenz, “Gnade und Erkenntnis” (n. 2), p. 46. 
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located outside, but pulled in, drawn in, by the interior light itself. The purpose of 
the interior light, also sometimes referred to as interior teacher, magister interior, 
also a reference to Christ, is not only to throw light on objects that are themselves 
dark, e. g. material objects, for us to be able to distinguish and categorise them. In 
good Platonic fashion the authentic purpose of the interior light is itself. The eye 
of the mind is itself the sun, or a particle of the sun. In the process of the human 
intellect in action God reveals himself, naturally, so to speak: Lumen ergo et alia 
demonstrat et seipsum. And, “there is yet another light by which the soul is lit up 
in order that it has insight (intellect) into everything both in itself and in this other 
light,” i. e. in God.24 And from this perspective Augustine indeed does look like 
an “ontologist”, although I am not able to discuss here all the implications of the 
relevant metaphors; e. g. how does Augustine understand the relationship between 
God and creation here? Between temporal and eternal? How does he understand 
the concept of participation? Including that of the participation of the soul in the 
inner-trinitarian communication? 
 The one question we could pursue in the context of our topic, however, is that 
of the agent. Who is actually the agent here? Who is doing the willing, the loving, 
the enjoying (perfrui) of the truth, God or the soul? For Augustine, the answer is, 
of course, clear. It is God. The soul is only itself, and active, through grace, i. e. 
by being received into God’s inner realm. Therefore there is strictly no difference 
between intellect and will. Although for us human beings, who do not fully share 
in God, there is, of course, a separatio between the two, which is also reflected in 
our tendency to deviate and turn towards the inferior.
25
 
 But the point (in us) where we do not do that, according to Augustine, is the 
point where God (Christ) acts in us, primarily intellectually. This is where grace 
in us is originally located, not as, in Augustine’s view, Pelagius and Julian would 
have it, in our natural ability, informed by the law, to choose and do the good.
26
 
 Lorenz rightly points out that there is a problem here. What, we might ask, is 
actually Augustine’s problem with the Pelagians? Could we not rather think of a 
continuum between his concept of grace and theirs, in the sense that on a more 
external, ephemeral, level grace is recognizing the match between “the law” and 
“what we ought to do” (morality), and on a more interior, central, level, grace is 
the convergence of intellect and will regarding the true and the good? After all, 
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creation, including humanity, is good. So what is Augustine’s problem with the 
Pelagian concept of grace, apart from the fact that it may not reach as deep as his 
transcendental approach? 
 As we know, for Augustine, nature is essentially fallen nature. This somehow 
flies in the face of what we have so far found out about his bringing together the 
two dimensions of intellect and will in grace. While nature is common to all men, 
salvific grace is not, according to Augustine. Nature on its own cannot achieve 
salvation, and this includes the natural human intellect, even if it is, by its own 
ingenuity, moved towards faith.
27
 For Augustine, that (natural) movement of faith 
on its own is never sufficient. 
Thus Augustine, as already mentioned earlier, overrides his more universal, 
Platonic, considerations regarding intellect and grace and focuses on what appears 
to be a rather arbitrary concept, namely predestination. It seems as if we have here 
a faultline running through Augustine’s thought, which Lorenz proposes to tackle 
by exploring its ontological (metaphysical) presuppositions, because at that level 
it can be shown how, for Augustine, they fit with his Platonism. 
 For Augustine, Lorenz observes, our inner experience of transcendence, which 
on the religious level has to be interpreted as an encounter with the Biblical God, 
corresponds on the metaphysical level with our existence thanks to the intellectual 
activity of the absolute transcendent being, in whom the timeless forms (or ideas) 
of all contingent beings subsist.
28
 Outside this eternal reality subsisting in God 
those beings only exist because God, in a form of panentheistic creatio continua, 
provides them with existence.
29
 If God ever decided to “stop” with this “quiet and 
stable operation”, the world would cease to exist. The very order, the fabric, of the 
world is identical with this operation, i. e. creation.
30
 
 Now this also applies to the human mind-soul, which, as we saw, comes to its 
own by “converting” to God and finding perfect intellect, goodness and happiness 
in God.
31
 This conversion is grace, its agent is God himself. The method is 
illumination. Through the light which is in the world through the Word the 
creature is “called” through an occulta inspiratio vocationis .32 At this level there 
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is no difference between grace and nature. God’s providence consists in his 
universal agency, his omnipotence in action. 
 Now what about the Fall? From a certain perspective, Lorenz observes,
33
 what 
we have just outlined is even more obviously, a fortiori, so to speak, the case after 
the Fall than before. God’s action, his retaining creation in existence, is even more 
obviously gratuitous now than ever: God turns everything into his direction, from 
the dead stone to the wayward human will.
34
 
 The particularity of his gratuitous action requires no further explanation. It is 
so by definition. Out of the nothingness of all innumerable possible worlds God 
creates this, existent, real, one; and out of the nothingness of the massa damnata 
God predestines this, existent, real, communion of saints. The fact that the non-
predestined are damned rather than simply non-existent is due to God’s upholding 
of his quiet action of keeping them in existence as the beings as which they were 
originally created. 
 The provocative question which could be asked at this point is whether this is 
not almost equivalent to saying that, ultimately, the damned were created thus. Or, 
as Lorenz puts it: “Although it is through sin that humanity is turned into a massa 
perditionis, the ultimate cause of damnation is not sin, but non-election.”35 Or, to 
use yet another provocative phrase: For Augustine, damnation is a form of grace. 
Insofar as the non-predestined have specific natures and are created beings, they 
share in the same creative grace as the elect, only to a lesser degree. 
 Whether anyone, including Augustine, could ever have found consolation in 
this kind of thought was not my intention to discuss in this paper. Clearly, Julian 
of Aeclanum, and many in his time and after him, found it deeply offensive and 
utterly disturbing, and not in tune with fundamental Christian belief. However, 
Augustine equally vehemently defended his position, and for Lorenz a possible 
reason for this is, quite intriguingly, in the light of what I would like to call the 
nihilistic, entropic, experience which pervades post-modern culture, the danger 
which he saw in not perceiving nature, metaphysically, as grace, namely that we 
then see grace, un-metaphysically, as mere nature. 
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